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COMMENT
THE FALLOUT OF
TOO BIG FOR TRIAL1 :
ADVOCATING CONTROL
PERSON LIABILITY
TUDOR JONES 

INTRODUCTION
“Do you think they know that you think something is a piece of crap
when you sell it to them and then bet against it, do you think they know
that?” 2
The Subprime Mortgage Crisis of 2008 (Subprime Crisis or Crisis)
caused an unprecedented worldwide recession. 3 Between 2007 and

1

Wall Street Reform: Oversight of Financial Stability and Consumer and Investor
Protections: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
S.Hrg. 113-3 (Feb. 14, 2013), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg80387/pdf/CHRG113shrg80387.pdf (phrase coined by Elizabeth Warren, Senator of Massachusetts, stated to Elisse
Walter, chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission).

Editor-in-Chief, Golden Gate University Law Review, J.D., 2014, Golden Gate
University School of Law; B.A., English Literature, University of California Los Angeles, 2001. I
am indebted to Mike DiGrande and Ilon Oliveira for their invaluable edits and patience in the
publication of this Comment, and to the entire Law Review Editorial Board for their humility and
passion throughout the year. I am eternally grateful to my family, friends, and mentors for sharing
their adventurous and dynamic thought processes with me, and to all those figures, public and
private, who have preceded us in this world; without a past to reflect upon, we would have no future
to grasp for.
2
Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks: Hearing Before the
U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 111-674 (Apr. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Hearing] (question of
Carl Levin, Senator of Michigan, posed to Lloyd Blankfein, Chief Executive Officer of Goldman
Sachs).
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2010, the global financial services sector lost 325,000 jobs. 4 In the
United States, consumer household net worth decreased by $11 trillion. 5
Meanwhile, C-level executives (hereafter, executives or corporate
officers) 6 from sixteen of the firms most closely associated with the
Subprime Crisis were eligible to receive golden parachute payments
approaching $1 billion if their firms’ failures had resulted in their
terminations. 7 Because of the government bailout program, 8 that money
would have been indirectly funded by United States taxpayers.
The Subprime Crisis presented the U.S. government with an
opportunity to establish new responses to financial crises through
reassessments of control person liability. To avoid repeating the types of
failure that precipitated the Subprime Crisis and caused the worst
national recession since the Great Depression, 9 legislators attempting to
stabilize a financial system that has become characterized by products of
unfathomable complexity 10 should take novel steps, in addition to
implementing regulations, to achieve their goals.
While this Comment later outlines at least one viable model for
legislators to follow, this introduction first sets the stage by discussing
inadequate past responses to crises, the general nature of the failures of
corporate leadership, and the inefficacy of the current corporate liability
model in deterring the kinds of failures that brought down the economy
in 2008. Two cases will be introduced to provide context and, from
there, the discussion will proceed.
Government responses to the Subprime Crisis followed familiar
patterns, predictably similar to responses to past crises. The pattern is as
follows: legislative committees hold hearings in which enraged public
3

See Jean Imbs, The First Global Recession in Decades, HEC LAUSANNE SWISS FINANCE
INSTITUTE
CEPR
PRELIMINARY
(October
12,
2009),
http://sta.uwi.edu/conferences/09/salises/documents/J%20Imbs.pdf.
4
Charles Roame, Prior CEO Summits 2008-2009, TIBURON STRATEGIC ADVISORS,
www.tiburonadvisors.com/Prior-CEO-Summits-2008-2009.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
5
Id.
6
This article uses the term “C-level executives” to define the highest level managers within
corporate structures, generally including, but not limited to, chief executive officer, chief financial
officer, chief marketing officer, and general counsel. See, e.g., Boris Groysberg et al., The New Path
to the C-Suite, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, March 2011, http://hbr.org/2011/03/the-new-path-tothe-c-suite/ar/1.
7
See Subprime Golden Parachutes Could Cost Shareholders More Than $1 Billion,
MARKET WIRE (Nov. 15, 2007, 1:33 PM), www.marketwire.com/press-release/subprime-goldenparachutes-could-cost-shareholders-more-than-1-billion-793604.html.
8
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat. 3765
(Westlaw 2014).
9
See Imbs, supra note 3.
10
See infra notes 196-197.
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officials question regulators 11 and business leaders. 12 New legislation to
protect consumers is proposed and strict regulations are imposed to
encourage stability and restore consumer confidence in the markets; 13
then, because increased regulation leads to higher product costs for
consumers and, surprisingly, decreased transparency to regulators, the
legislature passes laws that relax regulatory authority. The judiciary then
tries to work with regulations weakened by vague statutes.
Attempts to increase transparency have historically translated into
higher costs for consumers, 14 while also providing incentives for
managers to obscure information that might be deemed negative. 15
Because regulations have been reactive in nature, and because regulators
rarely possess the expertise necessary to constrain innovators of industry
(nor would they want to discourage innovation), the application of
prudential regulations in isolation to provide industry-wide stability
following a financial crisis has repeatedly proven futile. 16 Thus,
legislators must think outside the box, not only to monitor behavior and
appropriately punish those who violate laws, but actually to prevent
violations through a policy of deterrence. 17
Legislators must draw well-defined distinctions between cognitive
and moral failures before attempting to delineate any deterrent policy. 18
The essence of cognitive failure is that if an executive at Company X
does not fully understand the complexity of Product X, and neither does
Consumer X, then when that product proves to be worthless, there is no

11

See, e.g., SEC Regulators on Defense at SEC Hearing, NBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2009, 7:19
PM), www.nbcnews.com/id/28872450/.
12
Hearing, supra note 2.
13
See Ronald Borod, Belling the Cat: Taming the Securitization Beast Without Killing It, 31
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 643, 643-645 (2012) (enumerating eleven specific factors mentioned by
various commentators as contributing to the financial meltdown of 2008).
14
See infra note 243.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., Michael Perelman, The Futility of Financial Regulation: Lessons from Science
(Sep.
13,
2009),
and
Professional
Football, UNSETTLING ECONOMICS BLOG
http://michaelperelman.wordpress.com.
17
See Michael A. DiMedio, Comment, A Deterrence Theory Analysis of Corporate RICO
Liability for “Fraud in the Sale of Securities”, 1 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 (1994), for a discussion
of deterrence theory in relation to RICO liability in the context of securities litigation; see also
Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 1185, 1193-94 (2003) (“It is this layering of authority, fragmentation of responsibility, and
decentralization that has made it possible for the chairman, CEO and board of directors of Enron, as
well as the lawyers, to claim that they did not know much about what was going on in their own
company.”).
18
See Arnold Kling, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure?, 33 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507 (2010).
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accountability attendant to Executive X. 19 Caveat emptor. The
consumer is left footing the bill.
The characterization of a failure, as either cognitive on the one
hand, or moral on the other, should determine legislative strategy,
because the complexity of the response must be dictated by the
complexity of the failure. If those who hold all the chips do not know
any better, then perhaps their failures are of less serious scope than if
they fully understand the implications of their actions. If, however, they
understand that the complex financial products they sell to investors have
the potential to cause widespread economic devastation, 20 then perhaps
their actions should invoke liability more easily, and perhaps the
government would be justified in allowing novel remedies for suffering
investors. 21
In the case of the Subprime Crisis, pointing to the complexity of
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) has been the get-out-of-jail-free-card
for executives who might otherwise be held accountable. 22 Because of
heightened pleading standards, 23 the executives most responsible for the
failures associated with MBS could simply declare that incredible
complexities associated with their products created voids of
accountability, voids that compliance departments either could not or
would not address. 24 Executives could affirmatively claim good faith,
because under current law, for fraud to have occurred, they would have
had to misrepresent the facts or act with scienter. 25 Claiming the
complexity of products has allowed executives to deny misrepresentation
of facts, for if the products were too complex to understand, then
certainly misrepresentation was impossible to prove; similarly, if
corporate structures were too complex for plaintiffs to understand, then

19

See id.at 508 (“[M]arket mistakes went unchecked not because regulators lacked the will
or the institutional structure with which to regulate, but because they shared with the financial
executives the same illusions and false assumptions.”).
20
Robert D. Piliero, The Credit Rating Agencies: Power, Responsibility and Accountability,
THOMSON
REUTERS
NEWS
&
INSIGHT
(Jul.
19,
2012),
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/Insight/ViewInsight.aspx?id=52525&LangType=1
033 (“The financial impact on investors . . . has been devastating.”).
21
See discussion infra Part II.D.I-II.
22
Piliero, supra note 20.
23
See discussion infra Part II.B.I.
24
See, e.g., Ben Protess & Azam Ahmed, MF Global’s Risk Officer Said to Lack Authority,
N.Y. TIMES DEAL BOOK (Dec. 14, 2011, 9:53 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/mfglobals-risk-officer-said-to-lack-authority/ (“MF Global . . .stripped critical powers from its top
executive in charge of controlling risk, according to a person briefed on the matter.”).
25
See discussion infra Part II.B.I-II.
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the prospect of simply pleading control person liability proved too
difficult.
But what about the failure inherent in representing a position on
complex products without fully understanding the consequences; would
such a failure be cognitive only, or also moral? 26 The answer to this
question is important, for the law has historically treated various actors
differently depending on their moral turpitude. 27
If there is a legal distinction to be drawn between cognitive and
moral failures as they relate to crises in the financial sector, that
distinction ought to apply only to low-level employees of the companies
that cause economic loss. The Supreme Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend
elevated the legal status of corporate headquarters, specifically
discussing the heightened command and control elements inherent in
such places. 28 By defining command and control as corporate leadership
“direct[ing], control[ling], and coordinat[ing] the corporation’s
activities” from, specifically, corporate headquarters, Justice Breyer’s
opinion implied that it is precisely because corporate officers work at
corporate headquarters that such locations are properly described as the
principal places of business. 29 Thus, by extension of reason from Hertz,
there ought to be a distinct liability standard for corporate officers, one
that recognizes their heightened levels of command and control. 30 There
is no justice in characterizing the Subprime Crisis as pure cognitive
failure; accountability lies with everybody upstream of the sale of toxic
products, resting most squarely upon executives at the toxic product
26

Kling, supra note 18, at 508-509 (describing moral failure by analogy to a fire started by
delinquent teenagers whose parents were disinclined to supervise, and cognitive failure by analogy
to authorities providing the lighter fluid, matches, and newspapers to start the fire, yet unaware of
the inherent dangers in doing so).
27
Discharge, Exceptions to Discharge, and Objections to Discharge, NATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY
REVIEW
COMMISSION
179,
179
(1997),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/07consum.pdf (“Many nondischargeable debts involve
“moral turpitude” or intentional wrongdoing . . . . Society’s interest in excepting those debts from
discharge outweighs the debtor’s need for a fresh economic start.”).
28
See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) (interpreting the statutory phrase,
“principal place of business”).
29
Id. (“We conclude that ‘principal place of business’ is best read as referring to the place
where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities. It is the
place that Courts of Appeals have called the corporation’s ‘nerve center.’ And in practice it should
normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the
headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’ and
not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings (for example, attended by
directors and officers who have traveled there for the occasion).”).
30
For the purposes of this article, the term “command and control” is analogous to the
actions of corporate officers as they “direct, control, and coordinate” the corporation’s activities, as
described in Hertz.
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companies who knew or should have known that they were selling pieces
of crap. 31 It is these executives who reaped the most compensation 32 and
these executives who should have comprehended the risks involved with
availing the markets of whatever products their companies sold. 33 It is
under the direction of these executives that corporate cultures were
formed, 34 with these executives that shareholders, employees, and
investors placed their trust, and, this article argues, with these executives
that courts should assign ultimate liability through control-person
doctrine. 35 The failure to understand a product by an executive who then
directly or indirectly promotes that product is, of course, a cognitive
failure; 36 but worse, the failure by a society to clearly define a standard
of care owed to the investing marketplace as a whole, not just to
shareholders and employees, is a moral failure. 37 Moral failures from
corporate boardrooms to ratings agencies to regulatory bodies enabled
the Subprime Crisis; 38 in order to right past wrongs and prevent future
evils, it is essential that the lawmakers of this country remember the
Utilitarian principles espoused by Bentham to the Founders, and act
accordingly. 39
The doctrine of corporate liability presents an unsustainable legal
paradox. 40 While the corporation is now symbolic of American
capitalism, the corporate structure has not always been in favor; 41 so,

31

Hearing, supra note 2.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
33
See infra notes 196-197.
34
See discussion infra Part I.A.
35
See Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2311 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There is a dearth of authority construing Section 20(b), which has been
thought largely superfluous in 10b–5 cases.”) (internal citation omitted).
36
Kling, supra note 18, at 508.
37
See
JEREMY
BENTHAM,
A
FRAGMENT
ON
GOVERNMENT
(1776),
www.constitution.org/jb/frag_gov.htm (“[I]t is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is
the measure of right and wrong.”).
38
See Kling, supra note 18, at 508.
39
Bentham, supra note 37.
40
Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 593 (1988) (“Corporate criminal liability is a paradox [that] suggest[s] art imitating
life [or] life miming art False Through this anthropomorphic sleight of hand, the common law subtly
transformed the inanimate ‘corporation’ into a ‘person’ capable of committing criminal delicts and
harboring criminal intent.”).
41
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), in 12 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS
JEFFERSON
310
(Paul
Leicester
Ford
ed.,
1905),
available
at
http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/808 (follow “EBook PDF” hyperlink; then search “corporation”) (“I
hope we shall take warning from the example and crush in it’s [sic] birth the aristocracy of our
monied corporations which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength, and to bid
defiance to the laws of their country.”).
32
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while the continuing presence of corporations is likely to go
unchallenged, there is current debate over how corporations should be
held liable, with Senator Elizabeth Warren interpreting Attorney General
Eric Holder’s testimony to Congress as an admission that “the biggest
banks are too-big-to-jail.” 42 The victim of corporate misdeeds is the
broader corpus of the U.S. economy, and the main perpetrator is the
pervasive corporate culture that continues to allow big banks to plead
cognitive failures. If justice is the ultimate goal of a civilized society, 43
then, within that society, the existing doctrine of corporate liability
creates the unsustainable paradox of protecting individual executives
who may act with impunity because, when harm is inflicted, they are
able to hide behind the corporate veil.
The corporate structure has promoted economic growth precisely
because it provides limited liability to individual corporate employees.
Risk-taking has been favored as a result, and should continue to curry
favor, so long as accountability correlates with decision-making. While
most corporations are still small-scale, family-run operations, a relatively
small number of inordinately powerful corporations have grown so
large 44 that many of the original justifications for the inception of
corporations no longer apply to them. “The classical model of
corporations no longer accurately reflects the realities of corporate
governance for large, publicly traded corporations.” 45 Under the
classical model, shareholders are owners who elect board members who
in turn hire officers to manage the corporation. 46 However, when a
corporation goes public, the power of the original owners (shareholders)
to control the fate of the corporation is diluted as the capital of general
investors is exchanged for stock, resulting in the separation of control
from original ownership. 47 “The realist model of corporate structure . . .
[holds] that companies are management controlled because shareholder
dispersion ha[s] reached extremes which permitted decisions to be taken
by management in disregard of shareholders’ interests.” 48 Under the
42

Andrew Ross Sorkin, Realities Behind Prosecuting Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013,

at B1.
43

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 289 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) (“Justice is
the end of government. It is the end of civil society.”).
44
See William Arthur Wines & Thomas M. Fuhrmann, An Inquiry into CEO Compensation
Practices in the United States and Proposals for Federal Law Reform, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 221,
235 (2009) (stating that Mobil-Exxon, if it was a country, has revenues, if they were GDP, that
would make it the twentieth wealthiest country on earth).
45
Id. at 233.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 234.
48
Id. at 235.
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realist model, there is a bi-linear relationship that gives controlling
powers to the CEO and top management, and leaves shareholders with
little or no actual power in corporate decision-making. 49 Unsurprisingly,
executive compensation has skyrocketed, 50 but liability ultimately
remains with shareholders.
If justice is the goal of a civil society, then any system that protects
individuals from deserved liability is flawed. Take the following two
cases, for example. These lawsuits, filed against two high-profile
corporations, provide a glimpse of the means by which the government
has responded to the Subprime Crisis, but the results of these actions
raise troubling questions about the failures of corporate leadership and
control person liability.
In a 2009 criminal action, the United States filed eleven counts of
fraud against defendant Bernard L. Madoff. 51 Presumably because
Madoff had already openly admitted to running a Ponzi scheme, he pled
guilty and was sentenced to 150 years in prison. 52 In a related civil
complaint against Madoff and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities
(BMIS), 53 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed claims
for relief including fraudulent interstate transfers 54 under the Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 55 and employment of manipulative
deceptive devices 56 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act). 57
In a 2010 civil action against Goldman Sachs & Co. (Goldman
Sachs or Goldman) 58 and a Goldman employee, Fabrice Tourre, the SEC
claimed similar violations under the Securities Act and the Exchange

49

Id.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
51
U.S. v. Madoff, No. 08 Mag. 2735 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2008).
52
Diana Henriques, Madoff Sentenced to 150 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009.
53
SEC v. Bernard L. Madoff and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, No.08 Civ.
10791 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008).
54
15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(1), (2), & (3) (Westlaw 2014).
55
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a) (Westlaw 2014).
56
15 U.S.C. §78j(b), section 10(b), &17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 promulgated thereunder [Rule
10b5].
57
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a)
(Westlaw 2014).
58
Goldman Sachs is the most profitable securities firm in Wall Street history. Patricia
Hurtado & Christine Harper, Tourre Says He Relied on Goldman, Denies SEC Fraud Claims,
BLOOMBERG (Jul. 19, 2010), www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-20/tourre-says-he-relied-ongoldman-sachs-compliance-denies-sec-fraud-claims.html.
50
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Act. 59 In response, but without admitting or denying the allegations,
Goldman Sachs paid a record $550 million to settle the SEC charges. 60
Goldman returned $250 million to harmed investors through a Fair Fund
distribution and paid $300 million in fines to the United States
Treasury. 61 The settlement also required Goldman to implement
remediation of its review and approval processes of certain mortgage
securities, including fortifying the role and responsibilities of internal
legal counsel, compliance personnel, and outside counsel in the review of
written marketing materials. 62 Furthermore, the settlement required
Goldman to strengthen its education and training programs, and
Goldman acknowledged that it was conducting a comprehensive, firmwide review of its business standards. 63 In many ways, part of the
settlement required that Goldman reassess and reshape its corporate
ethos. 64
Because neither civil case went to trial, it is impossible to know
how defendants would have constructed legal arguments, how judges
would have ruled on contested testimony, or how rules of evidence
would have impacted outcomes. What is clear, however, is that both
BMIS and Goldman Sachs suffered from failures of leadership that led to
the firms having to disgorge ill-gotten gains and pay penalties. Madoff’s
guilt in perpetrating the Ponzi fraud had been established by his guilty
plea in the earlier criminal case; in the subsequent civil case, the SEC
was therefore not required to establish intent to prove Madoff’s
liability. 65 In the Goldman Sachs litigation, the SEC named Tourre, a
mid-level manager, rather than a corporate officer, as co-defendant with
the corporation. While the firm’s record settlement reflected a tacit
acknowledgment of minor failures in marketing materials, Goldman fell

59

S.E.C. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) motion to certify
appeal denied, 10 CIV. 3229 BSJ, 2011 WL 4940908 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011) and motion for relief
from judgment denied, 10 CIV. 3229 KBF, 2012 WL 5838794 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2012).
60
Press Release, S.E.C., Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (Jul. 15, 2010), www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm
[hereinafter Release].
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See discussion infra Part I.A.
65
Eugene Volokh, Comment to Criminal Liability and Civil Liability, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Sept. 4, 2008, 1:40 PM), www.volokh.com/posts/1220550026.shtml (“If you get criminally
convicted, then this conviction will usually make a civil plaintiff’s case against you much easier.
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . , if a fact has been decided against a party in one
judicial proceeding, then that fact is generally binding against the same party in future
proceedings . . . even in other jurisdictions and other court systems.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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short of acknowledging liability for the charges of fraud reflected in the
complaint. 66
Senator of Oklahoma Tom Coburn expressed doubt that a mid-level
manager such as Tourre had the type or level of responsibility at
Goldman that would enable him to perpetrate the type of fraud reflected
in the complaint, saying “if I worked for Goldman Sachs, I’d be real
worried that somebody has made a decision, ‘[I am] going to be a
whipping boy, [I am] the guy that’s getting hung out to dry.’” 67 Even if
evidence unequivocally established that Tourre did operate
independently, the results of his conduct strongly implicate shortcomings
in corporate culture and leadership from corporate headquarters. The
remaining questions about control person liability, 68 then, revolve around
rationales for assigning liability to corporate officers and the methods
that may be employed to establish that liability. 69
As the global economy was engulfed by a tsunami of toxic debt 70
and the United States legislature called on taxpayer funds to save
financial institutions that were deemed “too big to fail,” 71 stewards of
these same institutions enjoyed the security of bloated compensation and
severance packages, 72 yet remained free of liability to the ruined
consuming public. 73
This Comment’s argument is divided into three main parts. Part
One sets the scene by discussing the background of corporate criminal
liability and briefly outlining three laws passed shortly after the Great
66

Hurtado, supra note 58.
Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Tom Coburn, Senator of Oklahoma, to Blankfein); Id.
68
15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (Westlaw 2014) (“Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls
any person liable under any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable . . . unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.”).
69
See generally Darryl P. Rains, The Future of Control Person Liability After Janus, 9:2
THOMSON REUTERS SECURITIES LITIGATION REPORT, Feb. 2012, at 10-16, available at
www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120227-Liability-after-Janus.pdf (predicting the increased
use, and describing the implementation, of control person liability in private securities litigation).
70
The
‘Toxic
Debt’
Tsunami,
THE
WEEK
(Mar.
12,
2009),
http://theweek.com/article/index/94172/the-toxic-debt-tsunami.
71
“Too big to fail” is a doctrine that originated with the 1913 establishment of central
banking, that was included in the 1950 amendment to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1934 (as
the “essentiality doctrine”), and, finally, was given its current name in 1984, when the U.S.
government began to pursue a deliberate policy of bailing out large commercial banks that were
deemed “too big to fail.” See Richard M. Salsman, Banking Without the Too-Big-to-Fail Doctrine,
Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Conference (May 12, 1992), available at
www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/banking-without-the-too-big-to-fail-doctrine/#axzz2NXKz6g2p.
72
See discussion infra Part II.A.
73
See discussion infra Part II.B.I.
67
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Depression. Part Two narrows the discussion of corporate liability onto
executives by reviewing laws, enacted shortly before the Subprime
Crises, which facilitated both increased executive compensation and
decreased exposure to liability. It reviews a claim filed after the
Subprime Crisis by a private institution against the most profitable
securities firm in Wall Street history, then explores measures taken by
the federal legislature to try to address the causes of the crisis. Part
Three recommends securities industry self-regulation through a policy of
deterrence, facilitated by changes to current law, an immensely powerful
new regulatory agency with a highly articulated strategy of assessing
blameworthiness, and a judicial reinterpretation of corporate civil
liability based on existing corporate criminal liability doctrine.
I.

BACKGROUND

Corporations have been imputed with legal personhood. 74 In a
healthy economic system, corporate decision-making can be designed
not only to benefit shareholders, but also to contribute to the greater
good. 75 When decisions lead to criminal acts, corporations can be
subjected to criminal liability. 76 When decisions proximately cause
economic loss, corporations can be subjected to civil liability. 77 There is
a logical fallacy in this progression, which is that corporations are not
actual persons and, therefore, do not actually possess the capacity for
choice. The corporation itself is a legal construct. In the case of a
corporation operated by altruistic employees, corporate liability rightly
shelters from potentially ruinous penalties those employees who make
honest mistakes. In the case of a corporation operated by leaders whose
actions amount to fraud or misrepresentation or any other statutorily
proscribed act, the corporation and any individual employees responsible
can be subjected to criminal liability. 78 Whereas corporations of the past
enabled officers to benefit from the corporate structure, modern financial
services corporations often develop such intricate structural complexities

74

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2011 WL 6780141 (U.S.), 25-26 (U.S. 2011) (“All
legal systems also recognize corporate personhood . . . recognize that corporate legal responsibility
is part and parcel of the privilege of corporate personhood.”) (citation omitted).
75
Paul B. Brown, Strategic Corporate Altruism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, (“The essential
test that should guide corporate social responsibility . . . is not whether a cause is worthy but whether
it presents an opportunity to create shared value — that is, a meaningful benefit for society that is
also valuable to the business.”) (citation omitted).
76
See Kiobel, 2011 WL 6780141, at 25-26.
77
Release, supra note 60, at 8 (Goldman $550 million civil settlement).
78
See discussion infra Part I.A.
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that they end up providing shelter to executives whose actions appear to
disparage the collective good, even if they cannot be proven to amount to
fraud. 79
These most basic principles provide relevant guidance to legislators
and business leaders. Clearly delineated rules created by a legislature,
driven by consumer interests, consonant with the greater good, provide
clear signposts for businesses to follow. Clearly delineated rules within a
corporation can create a corporate culture, an ethos, 80 whereby neither
mistakes nor bad acts are likely to reach the consuming public, generally
through the administration of a robust compliance department. 81 The
shorter the distance between corporate management and the investing
public, the less likely it is that mistakes or violations will escape
detection. That is, the bigger the corporation and the more intricate its
structural complexities, the more difficulties management face in
maintaining and controlling corporate culture.
Part One addresses the background of corporate criminal liability
and securities law. Both the courts 82 and the legislature 83 have
recognized the important role that corporations play in the business
world, while also providing clearly delineated rules for corporations to
follow in order to work within the confines of the law. Although
corporate criminal liability is outside the scope of this article, the
development of this area of law is relevant. Also relevant to any
background discussion of modern securities litigation is a review of three
laws passed in the 1930s that created the framework for sustainable
development of the modern financial system. 84

79

It is hard to imagine how a highly-publicized, multi-million dollar settlement to a U.S.
regulatory agency is good for either corporate shareholders or for the broader investing public. See,
e.g., S.E.C. v. Goldman Sachs.
80
See discussion infra Part I.A.
81
See, e.g., News Release, Wells Fargo Names Yvette Hollingsworth Chief Compliance
Officer,
Wells
Fargo
(May
14,
2012),
https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2012/20120514_WellsFargoNamesYvetteHollingsworth
(“As
chief compliance officer, Hollingsworth will be responsible for ensuring that all areas of the
company meet compliance management responsibilities and abide by all applicable laws and
regulations. Her team will continue to provide independent oversight of business-based compliance
management activities.”).
82
See discussion infra Part I.A.
83
See discussion infra Part I.B.
84
See discussion infra Parts I.A-B.
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CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY:DEVELOPED FROM TORT LAW’S
VICARIOUS LIABILITY PRINCIPLE

In 2006, the Thompson Memorandum’s 85 policy, favoring federal
prosecutors’ capacity to pressure corporations to cooperate with
investigations against their own employees, came under criticism by
Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District Court of New York. 86
Within a year of Kaplan’s scathing critique of prosecutorial policies in
United States v. Stein, Assistant United States Attorney Preet Bharara
responded in writing in the American Criminal Law Review. 87 Whereas
Kaplan’s opinion had focused on alleged abuses of prosecutorial
discretion, Bharara effectively argued that prosecutors had gained
leverage not by abuses, but rather by 100 years of court-sanctioned
expansion of corporate criminal liability. 88
Unchecked prosecutorial discretion has the potential to “threaten the
functioning of entire industries and subject work forces the size of cities
to unemployment as a collateral consequence of . . . do[ing] what the law
However, the Court has never upheld checks on
permits.” 89
prosecutorial discretion. 90 Rather, courts “repeatedly concluded that the
scourge of corporate crime requires rules that are different, tough, and
effective in ferreting out wrongdoing.” 91 In other words, courts have
given more latitude to prosecutorial discretion where corporate crime is
involved.
Corporate criminal liability developed from its origin in the
landmark case New York Central v. United States. 92 Before that,
corporations were not indictable, but the Court in New York Central
looked to the law of torts for guidance, settling upon the concept of
vicarious liability as a leading principle. “The act of the agent . . . may
be controlled, in the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his
employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is

85

See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftfbusiness_organizations.pdf.
86
United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
87
Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (2007).
88
Id. at 54-55.
89
Id. at 59.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 60.
92
New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 29 S. Ct. 304, 53 L. Ed. 613
(1909).
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acting in the premises.” 93 The Court appears to have reasoned its
holding on the premise that at least one way to prevent illegal acts from
being committed by individuals was to give their corporate employers
powerful incentives to self-police. 94 The corporate defendant’s prescient
argument in New York Central, that to punish a corporation was actually
to punish its innocent shareholders, was dismissed by the Court. 95
As a consequence of the Court adopting the principle of vicarious
liability, a doctrine known as “collective knowledge” emerged in United
States v. Bank of New England. 96 Under the collective knowledge
doctrine, the aggregate knowledge of a corporation’s employees,
knowledge used to further the purpose of the corporation, is attributable
to the corporation itself for purposes of criminal liability. 97 The potency
of the collective knowledge doctrine derives from the fact that it exposes
a corporation to criminal liability even if no individual actor can be
identified for the purpose of proving intent. 98
The broader impacts of New York Central and Bank of New
England are three-fold. First, corporations can be held criminally liable
even if criminal conduct is undertaken without the knowledge of top
management. Second, corporations can be held criminally liable even if
the agent responsible for the crime cannot be identified. Third,
corporations can be held criminally liable even if the offending
employees are all acquitted of the same offense. 99 Therefore, if a lawbreaking employee can act discreetly enough to avoid detection by a
corporate compliance program, and prosecution under the law, and yet
the corporation is still criminally liable for the employee’s misconduct,
then the legal pendulum has swung too far away from its primary
purpose of providing justice. While “it is a logical paradox that this
creature of the law—the corporate entity—is created by the law with the
power to violate the law,” 100 it is an even greater logical paradox that this
creature of the corporation—the management executive—is created by
the corporation with the power to destroy it.

93

Bharara, supra note 87, at 61.
Id. at 81.
95
Id. at 61.
96
United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1987) (“[I]ts knowledge is the
sum of the knowledge of all of the employees . . .[t]hat is, the bank’s knowledge is the totality of
what all of the employees know within the scope of their employment.”).
97
Bharara, supra note 87, at 64-65.
98
Id. at 63-64.
99
Id. at 64-65.
100
Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962).
94

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss3/6

14

Jones: Too Big for Trial: Advocating Control Person Liability
365_JONES_TOO BIG FOR TRIAL_FORMATTED

2014]

8/1/2014 1:53:36 PM

Too Big for Trial: Advocating Control Person Liability

379

In his article, Bharara recognized the need for tightening rules for
corporate criminal liability. 101 He offered three approaches, one of
which is relevant to this discussion. Bharara attributed his coverage of
the corporate culture approach to “an influential article” wherein the
author “overcomes difficulties of attributing mens rea and assigning
blame to . . . an artificial entity by developing a corporate ‘ethos’
theory . . . by which prosecutors . . . and the public can identify the
blameworthiness of the corporation.” 102 According to this approach, the
values that Bharara focused on, namely the difficulties of finding intent
and the need to identify blameworthiness, are both met if a corporate
“ethos” can be identified. If “ethos” is defined as “the set of beliefs or
ideas about the behavior and relationships of a person or group” and
“most companies have a corporate ethos,” 103 and if executives comprise
the command and control components of a corporation, then a corporate
ethos should always be attributable to its executives. It follows that if a
corporation is found to be criminally liable for fraud, its command and
control executives should always be civilly liable, even if they are not
considered to possess the requisite specific intent to be found guilty
under criminal law. Executives that are criminally liable should be
civilly liable because they set the corporate ethos that propagated the
violation in the first place.
Just as corporate criminal liability doctrine developed with a keen
eye to the relationship between the corporation and the corporate
employee, so too should contemporary corporate civil liability doctrine
develop. Proscribed acts transgressed by individual employees can
rightly subject corporations to criminal sanctions (because of
blameworthiness and the need for justice in criminal issues), and the
collective knowledge doctrine thereby takes center stage. Similarly, acts
that cause financial crises, but without apparent intent on the part of any
individual, should also be attributable to the corporation, but, as in Hertz,
that attribution should be directed at the principal place of business. The
corporate ethos, after all, is what determines the direction of the

101

Bharara, supra note 87, at 107.
Id. at 107-108; see Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991) (“[T]he standard proposed herein imposes
criminal liability on a corporation only if the corporation encouraged the criminal conduct at issue.
If it did, the criminal conduct is not an accident or the unpredictable act of a maverick employee.
Instead, the criminal conduct is predictable and consistent with corporate goals, policies, and ethos.
In the context of a fictional entity, this translates into intention.”).
103
Ethos
Definition,
CAMBRIDGE
BUSINESS
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/business-english/ethos?q=ethos (last visited Mar. 22,
2013).
102
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corporation. The corporate officers who have overseen Goldman Sachs’
emergence as the most profitable securities firm in Wall Street history
are the same corporate officers whose alleged malfeasance resulted in the
largest settlement ever paid in an SEC action. These officers take
compensation for the first result, but are not held liable for the second
result.
B.

POST-STOCK MARKET CRASH LEGISLATION: BANKING,
SECURITIES, AND EXCHANGE ACTS

Modern securities law can be traced to the government’s response to
the Stock Market Crash of 1929 (Crash). In the wake of the massive
speculation and frauds that precipitated the Crash, 104 the federal
legislature addressed public concern about future financial industry
problems by enacting three laws, the Banking Act of 1933 (Banking
Act), 105 the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), 106 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 107
Taken separately, each of these laws reflects the awareness by
government of independent causative factors for the Crash. The Banking
Act was aimed at providing solutions to a problematic banking industry
structure, designed to address the problem of speculation 108 and to
restore faith in commercial banking by establishing the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 109 The Securities Act and Exchange Act
were more related to regulating behaviors. The goal of the Securities Act
was “to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold
in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent
frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.” 110 To accomplish this
goal, the Act required issuers of securities to make full material
disclosures about their products and to register them with the SEC. 111
The purpose of the Exchange Act was to regulate the secondary trading
104

Deepa Sarkar, Securities Law History, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL LEGAL
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history (last visited Mar. 14,
2013).
105
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (Westlaw 2014).
106
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a) (Westlaw 2014).
107
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a) (Westlaw
2014).
108
See Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History,
88:6 BANKING LAW JOURNAL 483–528 (1971).
109
See Carter Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of its
Antecedents and its Purposes, 75:2 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 181 (Jun., 1960).
110
§ 77a.
111
Id.
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of securities by brokers or dealers. 112 The Act established the SEC,
which became the “primary overseer and regulator of the U.S. securities
markets.” 113
While each of these laws established separate guidelines, when
taken together, they represent clearly defined policy-making. In
aggregate, these three laws were enacted in order to ensure that the
investing public would never again be subjected to the types of
speculative investing, fraud, or misrepresentation that created the 1929
Crash. In light of the extraordinary complexity of financial products and
corporate structures, both of which contributed to the Subprime Crisis,
one must consider whether each of these laws is still effective, or
whether they require slight or significant modification. One must also
question whether speculative investing, fraud, or misrepresentation are
still the benchmarks of liability or, rather, if concepts of liability ought to
be simplified. 114 Although these questions are technically outside the
scope of this Comment, this legislation is still highly relevant to the
discussion to come.
1.

Banking Act of 1933

The Banking Act has been commonly referred to by another name,
the Glass-Steagall Act (Glass Steagall). 115 The Glass-Steagall provisions
within the Banking Act, 116 those which required separation of
commercial and investment banking activities, were repealed in 1999 by
the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). 117 Critics of the
GLBA attribute responsibility for the Subprime Crisis to the fact that
commercial banks in 1999 were suddenly deregulated, liberated to use

112

§ 78a.
SEC, THE INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAINTAINS
MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION (2013) [hereinafter Investor’s
Advocate].
114
See e.g., James B. Stewart, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now Boggles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2011, at B1 (statement of Paul Volcker) (“I’d write a much simpler bill. I’d love to see a four-page
bill that bans proprietary trading and makes the board and chief executive responsible for
compliance. And I’d have strong regulators. If the banks didn’t comply with the spirit of the bill,
they’d go after them.”).
115
Glass-Steagall refers to the two proponents of the bills that were eventually combined an
enacted as the Banking Act of 1933, specifically Virginia Senator Carter Glass and Alabama
Representative Henry B. Steagall. See The Long Demise of Glass-Steagall, PBS FRONTLINE (May 8,
2003), www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html.
116
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and
the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1161 (1990).
117
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
6801) (Westlaw 2014) (also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999).
113
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investor deposits to underwrite complex and risky products, thereby
exposing the entire deposit banking system to the type of risk previously
reserved for sophisticated investors through investment banks. 118 While
this view is attractive for its simplicity, it is also worth noting two other
points: first, by 1935, Senator Glass himself had become dissatisfied with
these same provisions 119 and second, present-day supporters of the
GLBA such as Bill Clinton argue that it actually softened the impact of
the Subprime Crisis. 120
The legislative history of the Banking Act reveals the driving
factors behind its passage through both houses of Congress, while the
heavy involvement of President Franklin Roosevelt in the final drafting
process underscores the view that its passage was considered vital to the
health of the nation’s economy. 121 While Senator Glass initially
advocated the separation of commercial banking activities from
investment banking activities, he also sought to create a unified banking
system, whereby all banking institutions, whether large national banks
with branches in several states, or state chartered unit banks with only
one location, would be subject to the same measures of regulation under
the Federal Reserve System. 122 This unified banking system approach
was Senator Glass’ response to a rush of unit bank closures that
threatened the banking industry during the early 1930s. 123 The bill
passed Congress with minor changes to these two provisions by an

118

See generally Damian Paletta & Kara Scannell, Ten Questions for Those Fixing the
Financial
Mess,
THE
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(Mar.
10,
2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123665023774979341.html (stating President Barack Obama blamed
the GLBA’s deregulation for the financial crisis); see also Marcus Baram, Who’s Whining Now?
NEWS
(Sept.
19,
2008),
Gramm
Slammed
by
Economists,
ABC
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5835269.
119
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Did Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S. Economy’s
Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921-33? A Preliminary Assessment, GWU LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH
PAPER NO. 171, 4 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 559, 590 (2005),
available at http://sgfsrn.com/abstract=8382674.
120
See Maria Bartiromo, Bill Clinton on the Banking Crisis, McCain, and Hillary,
BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 23, 2008, available atwww.businessweek.com/stories/2008-09-23/billclinton-on-the-banking-crisis-mccain-and-hillary.
121
See Lyndon H. LaRouche, How FDR Reversed the 1933 Banking Crisis, 34:9 EXECUTIVE
INTELLIGENCE
REVIEW
40,
41
(Mar.
2,
2007),
available
atwww.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2007/eirv34n09-20070302/eirv34n09-20070302.pdf (statement
of Franklin Roosevelt) (“[W]e were busy drafting this legislation in conference with the
Congressional leaders, and also devoting ourselves to devising arrangements to permit the banks to
meet certain essential payments during the banking holiday.”).
122
See SUSAN ESTABROOK KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933 205-207 (Univ. Press of
Ky. 1st ed. 1973) [hereinafter Kennedy]; see also HELEN BURNS, THE AMERICAN BANKING
COMMUNITY AND NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS, 1933-1935 71-72 (Greenwood Press 1974).
123
See KENNEDY, supra note 122, at 207.
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overwhelming 54-9 vote on January 25, 1933. 124 In the House of
Representatives, Representative Steagall had been fighting to protect unit
banks by establishing federal deposit insurance, which would allow
smaller banks to compete for deposits with larger banks, 125 and to
preserve the “dual banking system.” 126 The House passed the bill by an
overwhelming 262-19 vote on May 23, 1933, and on June 16, 1933,
President Roosevelt signed H.R. 5661 into law, establishing the Banking
Act. 127
In 1999, nearing the end of the Clinton presidency, a period
characterized at least in part by its economic stability and growth, 128 the
GLBA repealed the provisions of the Banking Act that had separated
commercial and investment banking activities. The stated goal of the
GLBA, as indicated by its full title, was “to enhance competition in the
financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for the
affiliation of banks, securities firms, and other financial service
providers.” 129 The bill passed the Senate on May 6, 1999 by a slim
margin of 54-44. On July 30, 1999, the bill passed the House by a
margin of 241-132. 130
Neither the Banking Act nor the GLBA is cited in the case law
discussed below, as neither was enacted to provide guidelines for
behavior, but rather to define the structures within which financial
institutions must operate. However, the Banking Act and GLBA could
inform the aspirations of current government leadership. The Banking
Act enjoyed overwhelming support during its run through both houses of
Congress, due to the urgent need to restore faith in the United States
banking system. The GLBA was proposed and passed by a slim margin
during a period of economic prosperity. Whether it was a vehicle for
increased competition or rather, as some have suggested, a bill strong-

124

12 U.S.C. § 227; see also KENNEDY, supra note 122, at 73.
See Eugene White, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1541: Deposit Insurance,
WORLD
BANK,
wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1995/11/01/000009265_3961019154935/
Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
126
Christine E. Blair and Rose M. Kushmeider, Challenges to the Dual Banking System: The
Funding
of
Bank
Supervision,
FDIC,
www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2006mar/article1/article1.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
127
12 U.S.C. § 227.
128
See David Greenberg, Memo to Obama Fans: Clinton’s Presidency was not a Failure,
SLATE
(Feb.
12,
2008,
3:34
PM),
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history_lesson/2008/02/memo_to_obama_fans.single.ht
ml, discussing the economic strength created during the Clinton Presidency.
129
15 U.S.C. § 6801.
130
Id.
125
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armed into Congress by special interests, is debatable. 131 What is clear,
however, is that the economic climate dominated by a handful of wealthy
corporations in 2014 is more akin to the early 1930s than the late
1990s, 132 and as such, Congress should continue pushing for reform. No
good crisis should go to waste. 133
2.

Securities Act of 1933

The Securities Act required that any offer or sale of securities using
the “means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce” be registered
with the SEC. 134 Thus, given the broad interpretation of “means and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” the Securities Act applied to
the offer or sale of most securities traded in the United States. 135
The adoption of the Securities Act replaced the so-called “blue sky
laws.” 136 Whereas blue sky laws had conditioned the issuance of
securities on their merits, 137 the Securities Act rested on the idea that
disclosure of material information about a security from its issuer to its
consumer was a preferable means for registering securities offerings. 138
The main objective of the Securities Act was to ensure that buyers
of securities received complete and accurate information before
investing. 139 Issuers of bad investments would not be liable for damages,
as long as they provided full disclosure about the securities before
offering them for sale. Thus, “investors who purchase[d] securities and
suffer[ed] losses ha[d] important recovery rights if they c[ould] prove
that there was incomplete or inaccurate disclosure of important
information.” 140
By requiring issuers to create highly detailed
registration statements about the securities and the companies offering

131

Financial Services Modernization Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) (statement of Consumer Program Director Miervinski).
132
See Imbs, supra note 3.
133
“A crisis is a terrible thing to waste” is attributed to Paul Romer, a Stanford economist, in
his comments at a November, 2004 meeting of venture capitalists. Jack Rosenthal, A Terrible Thing
TIMES,
Aug.
2,
2009,
at
MM12,
available
at
to
Waste,
N.Y.
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/magazine/02FOB-onlanguage-t/html.
134
§ 77a.
135
§ 77a.
136
Richard I. Alvarez and Mark J. Astarita, Introduction to the Blue Sky Laws, SEC LAW,
www.seclaw.com/bluesky.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
137
Id.
138
§ 77a.
139
Id.
140
SEC, THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY: SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
(2013).
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them, 141 the SEC intended to “enable[] investors, not the government, to
make informed judgments about whether to purchase a company’s
securities.” 142 The intended result necessarily relies upon full disclosure
by the issuing company, without which a sustained high level of investor
confidence in the financial services market would be impossible.
The Securities Act contain provisions for litigation that can lead to
civil liability for the issuer and underwriters under sections 11 (material
misrepresentations and omissions in registration statements), 12(a)(2)
(misrepresentation in published materials), and 17(a)(1) (anti-fraud
provisions). 143
3.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934

The Exchange Act established the SEC, the agency whose current
mission “is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.” 144 The Exchange Act, and its
related statutes and regulations, form the framework within which the
investing public, through the SEC, can hold corporations and their
officers accountable. 145 The Exchange Act provides the right of an
individual private citizen to sue an issuer of stock through section 10(b)
(anti-fraud provisions) 146 of the Exchange Act and corresponding SEC
Rule 10b-5 (“employment of manipulative and deceptive devices”). 147
While the Securities Act was designed to regulate primary issuers of
securities, the Exchange Act regulates the secondary markets, which
include financial institutions of all sorts, as well as the physical
exchanges. 148
It has been said that novel problems demand novel solutions. But
sometimes this colloquialism is most forceful when turned on its head.
Sometimes old problems require novel solutions, while other times novel
problems demand old solutions. Financial crisis is nothing new in the
brief history of American Capitalism. Regulations alone have not
slowed the frequency, nor reduced the depth, of each successive financial
crisis. This Comment explores novel solutions to the familiar problem of

141

See id.
Id.
143
§ 77a.
144
See INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE, supra note 133.
145
See SEC, THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY: SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934 (2013) for coverage of corporate reporting, proxy solicitations, and tender offers.
146
§ 78j(b).
147
§ 240.10b5.
148
Id.
142
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recurring financial crises by interpreting old securities laws in new ways
and by redefining corporate civil liability doctrine with an appreciation
for the development of century-old corporate criminal liability doctrine.
II.

DISCUSSION

Part Two raises the issue of greed in the context of executive
compensation. It argues that laws have allowed executives to behave
with disregard for the greater good, costing U.S. taxpayers trillions of
dollars. This section specifically discusses two legislative acts that have
manifestly contributed to increased executive compensation and
decreased executive accountability, respectively. The case of Dodona v.
Goldman Sachs is reviewed in order to explain the current complexities
of both the marketplace and corporations. The Dodona discussion
squares up the element of scienter, while also touching on the related
issue of control person liability. Part Two continues the discussion by
reviewing some specific sections of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), and concludes the
discussion by highlighting the promise of the newly established
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau).
A.

MATERIAL APPRECIATION, AKA GREED: THE CORPORATE
EXECUTIVE

Early during his presidency, George W. Bush began pushing for
initiatives that would make it easier for every United States citizen to
enjoy the benefits of homeownership. 149 In addition to loosening credit
and documentation requirements for borrowers, another, unexpected
result was the psychological impact that the idea of homeownership had
upon the consuming public. 150
In the early 2000s, homeownership was made virtually inevitable
for anybody who had a pen and was ready to sign a document. Because
status could increase by way of homeownership, and because attaining
ownership of a home was made so easy, those who didn’t have a home
were stigmatized; their understandable response was to attempt to join

149

See Jo Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, & Stephen Labaton, Bush Drive for Home Ownership
Fueled Housing Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at B1.
150
See Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Identity: Vulnerability and Insecurity in the
Housing Crisis, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 120 (2012) (“[I]f property is classically
understood as a font of security, the stability property provides can ground people not only literally
but also emotionally.”).
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the home-owning populace. 151 Under this atmosphere of haves and
have-nots, the have-nots could so easily join the ranks of the haves that
they had little moment to pause to consider the consequences.
Meanwhile, executive compensation skyrocketed. In 2007, a
handful of executives at the largest firms in the United States took $613
million in compensation; 152 the CEO earned 400 times the income of the
average employee at the same firm in 2009. 153 Just as the apparent
economic status of the new homeowner grew with each home purchase,
so did the actual economic status of the executives grow with the rewards
from selling risky new products associated with the debt on those
houses. 154
The aspirational psychology of both groups, new and prospective
homeowners on the one hand, and executives at financial institutions on
the other, served to encourage a race to the top. While the madness that
accompanied non-stop material accumulation decreased any
consideration of accountability on either side of the transactions, 155 the
no-accountability atmosphere was almost assured as a result of actions
taken by Congress and the SEC.
B.

PRECIPITATING THE SUBPRIME CRISIS:THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT AND RULE 10B5-1 PLANS

Between the 1930s, when the securities laws were enacted, and
2008, when the Subprime Crisis decimated the United States economy,
long periods of stable growth were interspersed with lesser crises. 156
Then, in 2008, the United States economy suddenly teetered on the brink

151

See id.at 135; see also Leaf Van Boven et al., Stigmatizing Materialism: On Stereotypes
and Impressions of Materialistic and Experiential Pursuits, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 551, 551 (2010) (discussing research on social stigmatization of the materially deficient).
152
See Del Jones & Edward Iwata, Top Executives Pay Takes a Hit: Bailout Plan Seeks to
Rein in Compensation, Exit Packages, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2008, at Money 4B.
153
See Janice K. McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed Securities, Federal
Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake-Up Call for Reforming Executive
Compensation, 12 U. PA. BUS. L. 131, 174 (2009); see also Carl Levin, Pay Gap Between CEOs and
Workers
Now
a
Chasm,
STATE
NEWS
SERVICE,
June
8,
2007,
www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/in_the_news/article/?id=bf04517b-4fd3-4818-8575-64961bbbaf1d
(“[T]oday, the average CEO is paid nearly 400 times as much as the average worker.”).
154
See infra notes 196-197.
155
The lack of accountability shows most glaringly in the spike in foreclosures, the result of
both imprudent lending and borrowing. See Mark Zdechlik, All Things Considered: Congress Takes
Aim at Predatory Lending as Foreclosures Hit Minneapolis, Other Cities, MINNESOTA PUBLIC
RADIO (Feb. 7, 2007), www.thecurrent.org/feature/2007/02/07/foreclosures.
156
See, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (Wiley 5th ed. 2005).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 6
365_JONES_TOO BIG FOR TRIAL_FORMATTED

388

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/1/2014 1:53:36 PM

[Vol. 44

of another “Great Depression.” 157 Whereas some commentators have
assigned blame for the Subprime Crisis on the GLBA of 1999, 158 other
changes to Federal law significantly altered the behaviors of investors on
one side and executives on the other.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) was
passed “as a response to the alleged proliferation of securities class
action lawsuits that were perceived to be frivolous and instituted for the
purpose of attempting to unearth fraud through the discovery process
after filing the action or to secure a settlement.” 159 The aim of the law
was to stop frivolous lawsuits, but the effect of the law may have been to
make it more difficult for private litigants to state claims in what would
have otherwise been bona fide fraud cases. 160
In 2000, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-1 to provide executives with a
safe harbor from insider trading, as defined in Rule 10b5. 161 The goal of
the 10b5-1 plan was to enable executives to liquidate stocks while in
possession of inside information. Rule 10b5-1 plans were created for the
benefit of executives, who, it was thought, might have legitimate reasons
for liquidation, including the need to diversify holdings or contribute
significant capital to the economy by way of large purchases. 162
However, the construct of Rule 10b5-1 was flawed, so the end result of
the new rule did not meet its intended goal.
1.

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Preventing
Private Securities Claims Since 1995

Over a presidential veto, Congress passed the PSLRA, amending
the Exchange Act to include unique, and heightened, pleading
requirements for private claims alleging securities fraud. 163 The Court
has interpreted the “twin goals of the PSLRA” to be “to curb frivolous,

157

Lynton Weeks, Are We Teetering On The Edge Of Depression 2.0?, NPR (Oct. 16, 2008,
3:27 PM), www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=95798378.
158
Bartiromo, supra note 120.
159
Charles Alan Wright et al., 5A Federal Practice and Procedure § 1301.1 (3d ed. 2012).
160
See supra note 58.
161
Insider trading is defined as:
[A] manipulative and deceptive device[] [to] include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a
security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in
breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer
of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the cource of the
material nonpublic information.§ 240.10b5-1(a).
162
See Karl T. Muth, With Avarice Aforethought: Insider Trading and 10b5-1 Plans, 10 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 65, 66 (2009).
163
Wright, supra note 159.
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lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to recover on
meritorious claims.” 164 Lower courts have pointed to the harm that fraud
claims potentially pose to businesses. 165 The PSLRA appears to
represent a strong Congressional intent to side with business.
The PSLRA does not apply to public actions such as those initiated
by the SEC, 166 and also does not apply to violations of law under the
Securities Act that do not require scienter as an element. 167 In relevant
part, the PSLRA reads: “(b) Requirements for securities fraud actions.(2) Required state of mind.-In any private action arising under this
chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on
proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the
complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate
this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 168

It is clear why establishing control person liability has proven so
difficult: top management is often insulated from the day-to-day
communications 169 that might inform pleading requirements in securities
claims alleging “misleading statements and omissions.” 170
The
discussion now turns to the pleading requirement for scienter, or
“required state of mind.”
Courts were split on the level of particularity in the pleader in
regard to the statute’s “strong inference” requirement. There were three
approaches before the Court settled on a single interpretation in Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. in 2007. In the Second Circuit, the
pre-PSLRA standard remained, stating that plaintiffs could sufficiently
plead scienter by alleging, with particularity, facts “that 1) establish that
the defendant had a motive and opportunity to defraud, or 2) constitute

164

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 309 (2007).
Robert N. Clemens Trust v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007).
166
S.E.C. v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, 2010 WL 3790811, *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The
more stringent pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act . . . do not
apply to actions brought by the SEC.”), citing S.E.C. v. ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d
1097, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
167
In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litigation, D.C.Tex.2002, 235 F. Supp.2d
549 (Harmon, J.) (“Where claims under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act are grounded in
negligence rather than fraud, there is no scienter requirement and it need only satisfy the liberal
pleading requirements of Rule 8.”).
168
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-67, §101(b)(2), 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (Westlaw 2014).
169
Wright, supra note 159.
170
§ 101(b)(1).
165
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circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior.” 171 The
Ninth Circuit interpretation of the PSLRA was stricter than the Second
Circuit, requiring the plaintiff to plead deliberately reckless conduct, thus
demanding a heightened standard of recklessness. 172 Finally, other
courts advocated for various standards between the Second and the Ninth
Circuits, but held generally that motive and opportunity “‘are not
substitutes for . . . recklessness, [but] can be catalysts to fraud and so
serve as external markers to the required state of mind,’ thus accepting
that motive and opportunity might establish scienter, but only insofar as
it establishes recklessness.” 173 Meanwhile, a court in the Tenth Circuit
held that “allegations of motive and opportunity may be important to the
totality but are typically not sufficient in themselves to establish a ‘strong
inference’ of scienter.” 174 Thus, when it decided Tellabs in 2007, the
Court attempted to resolve the issue of how to interpret the term “strong
inference,” but within that issue the Court also had to deal with the
considerations of motive, opportunity, and recklessness raised in the
lower courts.
In deciding Tellabs, the majority distilled the discussion into a
consideration of whether courts ought to “consider competing inferences
in determining whether an inference of scienter is strong.” 175 On this
issue, the majority said that courts “must take into account plausible
opposing inferences” 176 and that “to qualify as ‘strong,’ an inference of
scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.” 177 Thus, in deciding the “strong inference” issue, the
Court solved one problem, but opened the door to several, more difficult
causes for concern, including: (1) because of the multiple complexities of
facts in securities fraud case, courts have difficulties determining the
relevant strengths of various facts; 178 (2) because the PSLRA is a
pleading statute, courts are faced with comparisons of plausibility based

171

Wright, supra note 159.
Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167, 1180 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To establish
scienter, a complaint must allege that the defendants made false or misleading statements either
intentionally or with deliberate recklessness.”) (quotations omitted).
173
Wright, supra note 159 (quoting Helwig v. Vencor, 251 F.3d 540, 550 (Merritt, J.)).
174
City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 264 F.3d 1245 (C.A. 10th 2001).
175
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 309.
176
Id. at 323.
177
Id. at 313.
178
See In re Ceridian Corp. Secs. Litigation, 542 F.3d 240 (8th Cir. 2008) (“When a party
asserts, for example, that six factors collectively warrant a particular conclusion, we do not assume
the district court failed to view the six collectively merely because it discussed them one at a time.”).
172
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on competing factual inferences provided by only one side; 179 (3)
whether the cogent and at least as compelling as prongs comprise a rigid
two-part test or whether a compelling inference implies cogency; 180 and
(4) what weight to give to confidential 181 sources. 182
Application of the PSLRA remains a source of discord among the
courts, especially in light of the Court’s post-Tellabs characterization of
what is necessary for “strong inference” of scienter. This is due to the
inherent complexities of modern securities products and services as
much as it is due to the complex structures of modern corporations. 183
Yet there exists an impetus to address and potentially amend the PSLRA
because “[t]his level of litigation intensity against a single industry is
unprecedented since the passage of the 1995 Reform Act.’ Nearly a third
of all large financial institutions—representing more than half of the
financial sector’s total market capitalization—were sued in a securities
class action filed in 2008.” 184 While much of this litigation has been
brought under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, which
provide causes of action for misrepresentations in registration statements,
thus obviating the need to prove scienter, the difficulty in showing
control person liability under the Securities Act because of the need to
prove actual conduct means that the best avenue for litigants trying to sue
officers remains fraud under the Exchange Act.
2.

Rule 10b5-1 Plans: Inviting Market Manipulation

The Exchange Act holds that it is “unlawful . . . [to] use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such

179

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Compare In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Derivative Litigation, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044
(C.D. Cal. 2008) (applying a two-step approach by first concluding that the inference of scienter
against each defendant was cogent and then proceeding to test whether it was more plausible than
opposing inferences),with Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2007)
(completely foregoing any comparison or making comparisons implicitly).
181
Compare Higginbotham, 495 F.3d at 356 (discounting confidential sources),and New
Jersey Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC Inc., 537 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2008)
(“[T]here must be a hard look at [the allegations of confidential sources] to evaluate their worth.”).
182
Wright, supra note 159.
183
See supra pp. 369-70.
184
Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Cornerstone Research,
Securities Class Action Filings 2008: A Year in Review at 1, 4 (Jan. 2009), available at
http://securities.stanford.edu.
180
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rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.” 185 However, 10b5-1
plans provide executives with a safe harbor against prosecution for
insider trading. 186 The crux of the 10b5-1 plan is that it “allows the
actual liquidation transaction to occur while the plan participant is in
possession of inside information, as long as the orders or instructions
causing the trade were created as part of a plan that predates the insider’s
acquisition of the pertinent information.” 187 It therefore requires
executives to set a predetermined schedule for the liquidation of their
holdings. This is designed to remove the element of control from the
executive, such that if trades are predetermined, then the existence of
insider information is irrelevant in the context of “manipulation” as
mentioned in the Exchange Act. 188
The rule is flawed, however, because it fails to address the
command and control that the privileged executive maintains over
factors, not categorized as inside information, which can affect stock
prices. 189 For common investors who do not have access to inside
information, the time to buy or sell is driven by personal speculation or
solid research. However, the theory of Rule 10b5-1 is that for an
executive whose holdings are in a 10b5-1 plan, the time to buy or sell has
already been determined by the scheduled liquidation of the holdings, so
inside information that becomes available is worthless. For the corporate
officer who is able to exert sufficient control over the company, there are
factors that can be influenced in order to make the price of a stock meet a
predetermined plan, including the timing of the release of company
information, 190 creative structuring of financial information, 191 and the
manipulation of public expectations about stock price. 192 Each of these
factors can and do affect market dynamics. 193
In the wake of disproportionate executive compensation, Rule 10b51 has been the subject of much heated discussion. For instance, a simple
and easy solution to 10b5-1 plan problems could be to require executives
185

§ 78j(b).
See § 240.10b5-1(c).
187
Muth, supra note 162, at 66.
188
§ 240.10b5-1(a).
189
See Muth, supra note 162, at 75-76.
190
Id. at 70.
191
Id. at 73.
192
Id. at 75.
193
“Market dynamics describes the dynamic, or changing, price signals that result from the
continual changes in both supply and demand of any particular product or group of products. Market
dynamics is a fundamental concept in supply, demand and pricing economic models.” Market
Dynamics, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/m/market-dynamics.asp (last visited Mar.
22, 2013).
186
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to hold themselves accountable to the SEC by making their plan criteria
known before implementing their plans. 194 Increased transparency
would make it easier for authorities to police malfeasance associated
with those tempted to circumvent Rule 10b5.
The PSLRA made it much more difficult for private securities
litigants to sustain pleas and win cases. Though Rule 10b5 had
originally been drawn to provide executives with lawful and sensible
ways to tie compensation to performance, 195 the effect of the rule’s safe
harbor provision was to encourage executives to abuse the power of their
positions to possibly manipulate information, thereby increasing
compensation by attaining predetermined performance plans. The
Dodona case, presented below, illustrates how manipulation of market
dynamics allowed one firm to benefit from inside information at the
expense of another.
C.

ASSESSING SCIENTER AND CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY:
DODONA V. GOLDMAN SACHS

In 2012, Dodona, an institutional investor in residential MBS 196
issued as part of two synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 197
filed a putative class action suit against Goldman Sachs, its subsidiary
companies, and its officers alleging securities fraud and common law
fraud. 198 The court’s reasoning provides a clear roadmap of how to
address the element of scienter in securities law violations pursuant to
the Exchange Act. 199 It also addresses control person liability.
For the purposes of this discussion only, the following factual
allegations are taken as true. By 2006, Goldman Sachs was “long” on

194

Muth, supra note 162, at 60.
See Wines, supra note 44 for a full discussion on Rule 10b5-1 plans.
196
“A type of asset-backed security that is secured by a mortgage or collection of mortgages.
These securities must also be grouped in one of the top two ratings as determined by a[n] accredited
credit rating agency, and usually pay periodic payments that are similar to coupon payments.
Furthermore, the mortgage must have originated from a regulated and authorized financial
institution.”
Mortgage-Backed
Security
(MBS),
INVESTOPEDIA,
www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mbs.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
197
“CDOs are unique in that they represent different types of debt and credit risk. In the case
of CDOs, these different types of debt are often referred to as ‘tranches’ or ‘slices’. Each slice has a
different maturity and risk associated with it. The higher the risk, the more the CDO pays.”
Collateralized Debt Obligation – CDO, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp (last
visited Mar. 22, 2013).
198
Dodona v. Goldman Sachs, 847 F.Supp.2d 624 (2012).
199
The plaintiffs charged, and the court addressed, securities fraud under the Exchange Act,
common law fraud, and unjust enrichment. Those charges, as well as the other elements of
securities fraud, are outside the scope of this article. See Dodona, 847 F. Supp. at 636-652.
195
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subprime mortgage-backed securities. 200 Also, by that time, Goldman
realized that the subprime mortgage-backed securities market was
doomed. 201 In response, Goldman embarked on a risk-reduction
program. In December of 2006, Goldman’s chief financial officer
directed a reduction in Goldman’s exposure in the subprime market,
stating in an email that “Goldman should be ‘aggressive’ in shedding
subprime assets, and predicting that ‘there will be very good
opportunities as the market goes [south] . . . and we want to be in a
position to take advantage of them.’” 202 By August of 2007, Goldman
informed the SEC that it had reduced its exposure to subprime mortgagebacked securities from $7.2 billion to $2.4 billion. 203
One strategy Goldman employed to reduce risk was to stop going
“long” in the subprime market and start acquiring “short” positions. 204
Along the way, Goldman created the synthetic Hudson CDOs, 205 which
it took short positions on, then marketed to clients through a marketing
book by declaring, through veiled language, that it was actually long on
them. 206 In relevant terms, “Goldman’s strategic shorting allowed it to
profit from the loss in value in the Hudson CDOs.” 207
1.

Scienter: Establishing Motive and Recklessness; More Like Res Ipsa
Loquitur?

Under the authority of the Exchange Act, “Dodona allege[d] 1)
misrepresentations or omissions of material fact and 2) market
manipulation.” 208 Scienter, “a mental state embracing intent to deceive,

200

A “long” position indicates that the investor believes the security is a good long-term
investment.
201
Dodona, 847 F.Supp. at 631.
202
Id. at 632.
203
Id. at 633.
204
Id.
205
Synthetic CDOs are essentially the opposite of CDOs. That is, while CDOs are based on
pools of asset-backed securities, synthetic CDOs are merely derivative of the value of CDOs and are
based on nothing more than the idea that the value of the CDOs might go down. Essentially, a
synthetic CDO is a bet against CDO, used for leverage. See Goldman’s Abacus: The Difference
Between a CDO and a Synthetic CDO, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 22, 2010, 2:56 PM),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/200264-goldman-s-abacus-the-difference-between-a-cdo-and-asynthetic-cdo.
206
Dodona, 847 F.Supp. at 634 (the Marketing Book reported that “Goldman ha[d] aligned
incentives with the Hudson program by investing in a portion of equity and playing the ongoing role
of Liquidation Agent.”).
207
Id. at 635.
208
Id. at 636.
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manipulate, or defraud,” 209 was a necessary element for Dodona to prove
in both allegations. In accordance with the PSLRA, private litigants such
as Dodona are required to plead a “strong inference” of scienter, which
means that plaintiffs must allege with particularity either (a) “facts to
show that the defendant had both motive and opportunity to commit
fraud[;]” or (b) “facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of
conscious misbehavior or recklessness.” 210 With regard to corporations
and corporate officers, courts assume that opportunity to commit fraud
exists. 211 However, motives that normally incent corporate officers
generally do not establish scienter. 212 In order to prove scienter, then, on
the part of Goldman or its officers, Dodona had to show strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. Such
evidence may exist where the plaintiff can show “conduct which is
highly unreasonable and which represents an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care to the extent that the danger was either known
to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware
of it.” 213 In terms of the Hudson CDOs, Dodona would sufficiently
plead scienter by showing that Goldman had access to information
contradicting the statements in its marketing book. 214
Difficulties in proving scienter in private litigation of securities law
violations under the Exchange Act relate to the requirement that the
plaintiff plead with particularity that a corporate officer either 1) had
motive to defraud, or 2) bore the requisite conscious recklessness related
to the commission of a fraud. Not every case will have the type of
smoking gun evidence, such as the emails from Goldman Sachs, present
in Dodona; and even where this evidence does exist, Dodona shows that
implicating control persons is difficult given the current pleading
standards. In public actions, the SEC is permitted to plead scienter to a
lower standard than in private matters governed by the PSLRA. There is
strong rationale for extending these lower standards to private actions.

209

Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319.
Dodona, 847 F.Supp. at 638 (quoting Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2001)).
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 142.
214
Id. (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 308 (6th Cir. 1999)).
210
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Control Person Liability: Culpable Participation via the Corporate
Ethos

Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act imposes derivative liability on
controlling persons for the actions of controlled persons, “unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.” 215 A
plaintiff must “show that the controlling person was in some meaningful
sense [a] culpable participant[ ] in the fraud perpetrated.” 216
Difficulties associated with claiming derivative control person
liability in the context of private claims of securities law violations not
only suffer under the higher PSLRA-dictated standards of pleading, but
also under the near impossibility of proving that a corporate officer
maintained direct and timely control over, or was a culpable participant
in, the fraud perpetrated. In the case of Goldman’s chief financial officer
who sent the email stating that “Goldman should be aggressive in
shedding subprime assets, and predicting that there w[ould] be very good
opportunities as the market [went south],” 217 no rational person could fail
to understand the subtext of the message; that Goldman’s costly holdings
should be dumped on unassuming investors and that Goldman would
make a lot of money in the process. But while the rational person is the
standard by which courts almost universally discern rightful conduct, in
the case of establishing control person liability, the subtext of the email
is meaningless. Without being able to plead with particularity, and then
attempt to prove, the specific actions that sprang from that email, the
private securities litigant will fail to ascribe liability to the author of that
email under current securities law.
Dodona provides a glimpse into the complexities of post-Subprime
Crisis securities fraud litigation. Claims filed against Goldman Sachs
benefit from the fairly widely-held understanding of the factual
allegations described above. 218 The example of the Hudson CDOs
outlined for this discussion is just one of several similar schemes
employed by Goldman Sachs between 2006 and 2007 during its “risk-

215

15 U.S.C. § 78t.
§ 78t.
217
Dodona, 847 F. Supp. at 632.
218
Goldman Sachs has been sued several times on several different mortgage-related
securities claims relating to CDOs, including ABACUS 2007 AC-1, Hudson Mezzanine Funding
2006-1, The Anderson Mezzanine
Funding 2007-1, and Timberwolf I. See, e.g., Richman v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 868 F. Supp.
2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
216
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reduction” period. 219 The high-profile nature of the firm and its welldocumented alleged violations of securities laws raise the issue why its
top management has not been the subject of more serious litigation
efforts by private parties.
One explanation is offered above: because of corporate structural
complexities that, by design, protect the interests of corporate officers
even to the detriment of shareholders and clients, there is no way to tie
control persons as culpable participants to malfeasance conducted by
subservient employees. However, in a civil society, where justice is the
end of the government, the solution to the problem of such unjust results
must be a novel response by government itself. Hertz has provided
courts with guidance as to where to find command and control, and the
doctrine of corporate criminal liability reflects an understanding that
every corporation has its own ethos. The next logical step for Congress
and the judiciary to take is to impute corporate officers, those with whom
the architecture of corporate ethos lies, with ultimate liability for
decisions the corporation makes at the expense of the common good.
D.

LEGISLATORS: DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

Legislators have begun to take aim at solutions. The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) is the
most comprehensive set of financial regulations since the Banking Act of
1933. 220 The lofty goals and massive scope of Dodd-Frank inform its
full title: “to promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts,
[and] to protect consumers from abusive financial practices.” 221 DoddFrank, simply put, affects every aspect of the financial services industry
by overhauling the American financial regulatory environment. Most
aspects of Dodd-Frank are beyond the scope of this Comment, but
several sections are relevant to the recommendations below.

219

Id.
See James S. Henry & Laurence J. Kotllikoff, Financial Reform, R.I.P., FORBES (Jul. 15,
2010, 1:20 PM), www.forbes.com/2010/07/15/dodd-frank-failure-regulation-opinions-contributorsjames-henry-laurence-kotlikoff-wall-street.html, for a discussion of the magnitude of the DoddFrank legislation.
221
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (Westlaw 2014) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
220
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The Volcker Rule, under Title VI, is a modern-day corollary of the
Glass-Steagall provisions of the Banking Act. 222 In the simplest terms, it
provides a partial prohibition on proprietary trading 223 by separating
banking institutions from the types of risky, complex, and ethically
questionable incentives that allegedly drove Goldman Sachs’ conduct
with regard to the type of trading exemplified in Dodona. The Executive
Compensation Clawback Full Enforcement Act of 2012 (Clawback
Act), 224 which died in committee, nonetheless represented a novel
legislative approach that is worthy of further consideration. Also, it is
worth noting that the Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of
2010 (Investor Protection Act), under Title IX, subtitle E, specifically
addresses accountability alongside executive compensation. 225
1.

Volcker Rule: A Ban on Proprietary Trading

The Volcker Rule bears the imprimatur of its author, 226 who
previously argued that commercial banks provide stability for the greater
financial system and that schemes such as derivatives trading, which
involve high-risk speculative investing, pose an impermissible level of
systemic risk. 227
The proposed Volcker Rule would have resulted in a complete ban
on proprietary trading, but in order to gain passage through Congress,
allowances were granted that weakened the bill considerably, which may
indicate that Congress has failed to grasp the implications of its
responsibility to the people, rather than to corporate interests. The
222

See Louis Uchitelle, Glass-Steagall vs. the Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX (Jan. 22, 2010,
4:47
PM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/glass-steagall-vs-the-volcker-rule/
(discussing the similarities between how Glass-Steagall and the Volcker Rule are both regarded as
fixes to major causes of the two large crises).
223
Proprietary
Trading,
FINANCIAL
TIMES
LEXICON,
http://lexicon.ft.com/term?term=proprietary-trading (last visited Jun. 14, 2014) (“When a bank,
brokerage or other financial institution trades on its own account rather than on behalf of a
customer . . . . In simple terms, proprietary or prop trading is where a trading desk, using the bank’s
own capital and balance sheet, carries out trades in various instruments, often for speculative
purposes.”).
224
H.R.5860,
112th
Cong.
(Westlaw
2014),
available
at
www.doddfrankupdate.com/Resource.ashx?sn=ExecutiveCompensationClawbackFullEnforcementA
c2012 [hereinafter Clawback].
225
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 951-957 (Westlaw 2014).
226
Paul Volcker is an economist and former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve.
See Paul Volcker Fast Facts, CNN (Jan. 30, 2013, 6:39 PM), www.cnn.com/2013/01/30/us/paulvolcker-fast-facts.
227
See Paul Volcker, How to Reform Our Financial System, N.Y. TIMES,
www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/opinion/31volcker.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
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Volcker Rule was aimed at precisely the type of institutional behavior
exemplified in the discussion of Dodona. In fact, Volcker would have
preferred a much simpler bill, saying, “I’d love to see a four-page bill
that bans proprietary trading and makes the board and chief executive
responsible for compliance. And I’d have strong regulators. If the banks
didn’t comply with the spirit of the bill, they’d go after them.” 228
2.

Clawback Act: A Novel Legislative Approach

In 2012, Representative Barney Frank drafted the Clawback Act,
the stated purpose of which was “to prohibit individuals from insuring
against possible losses from having to repay illegally-received
compensation or from having to pay civil penalties.” 229 Insurance
brokerages in 2011 launched new products through which executives
could protect themselves from claw-back settlements due to non-fraudrelated violations for which they were deemed personally liable. 230
When Frank introduced the bill to the House, he stated “the creation of
insurance policies to insulate financial executives from claw-backs is one
more effort by some in the industry to perpetuate a lack of
accountability.” 231
The Clawback Act, if adopted, would have
essentially forced executives to pay judgments out of pocket, rather than
being able to pay premiums to cover judgments in the events of findings
of accountability.
The specific language Frank used illustrates the broad effects he
hoped to achieve by introducing the bill:
(a) an officer, director, employee, or other institution-affiliated party
of a depository institution, depository institution holding company, or
nonbank financial company who is required by the Federal financial
regulatory law that provides for personal liability, or any rule or order
promulgated by a Federal financial regulatory agency thereunder, to
repay previously earned compensation or pay a civil money penalty–
(1) shall be personally liable for the amounts so owed; and (2) may
not, directly or indirectly, insure or hedge against, or otherwise

228

See James Stewart, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now Boggles, N.Y. TIMES,
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/business/volcker-rule-grows-from-simple-tocomplex.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
229
Clawback, supra note 224.
230
See Alexandra Alper & Ben Berkowitz, Representative Frank Offers Bill to Bar Insurance
on
Claw-Backs,
REUTERS(May
30,
2012),
http://reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE84T15720120530.
231
Id. (quoting Rep. Frank).
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transfer the risks associated with, personal liability for the amounts so
owed. 232

The Clawback Act, if adopted, would have had the capacity to reach into
every type of regulated financial institution in the United States to touch
any employee found to have been personally liable in contravention of
“Federal financial regulatory law that provides for personal liability, or
any rule or order promulgated by a Federal financial regulatory agency
thereunder.” 233 The Bill specifically defined Federal financial regulatory
law as most major banking laws, including in relevant parts “. . . (C) the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act . . . and
(Q) the securities laws (as defined under section 3(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934), to the extent that such laws apply to depository
institutions, depository institution holding companies, or nonbank
financial companies.” 234 The Clawback Act would have extended to
personal liability resulting from all types of remunerative measure, and
such a deterrent might have prevented the Subprime Crisis.
That one of Congress’ higher profile representatives would actually
draft and propose a bill such as the Clawback Act offers promise that, at
the very least, the legislature is considering anew remedies as to
corporate officers. There is no guarantee that a law such as the one
proposed would have actually impacted the behavior of corporate
officers, but in the current economic climate, it is this type of new
thinking that will be required to affect real change. 235 It would have
forced executives to consider the full magnitude of their actions, to fully
embrace the possibility that they might be held personally liable for
losses incurred in their professional duties. However, the failure of
Congress to pass the Clawback Act illustrates the continuing need for
legislative action in the area of executive liability.
3.

Investor Protection Act: Accountability and Executive
Compensation

The Investor Protection Act forms Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Its main purpose is to amend the powers and structure of the SEC in

232

Clawback, supra note 224, at §§ 2(a) & (b).
§ 2(a).
234
§ 5.
235
See Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011 - 2012), H.R.5860, THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:hr5860: (last visited March 22, 2013); see alsoH.R.
5860 (112th): Executive Compensation Clawback Full Enforcement Act, GOVTRACK,
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr5860 (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
233
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order to better delineate the acceptable relationships between consumers
and broker-dealers or investment advisers. 236 Subtitle E specifically
addresses the need for the SEC to define issues surrounding
accountability and executive compensation.
Among the measures contained under subtitle E are reporting
requirements about executive compensation, 237 periodic shareholder
voting opportunities for approval of executive compensation packages, 238
oversight of Golden Parachutes, 239 accounting provisions related to the
ratios between CEO compensation and average employee
compensation, 240 permissibility of special compensation plans involving
hedging financial instruments, 241 and rules about who may occupy seats
on Compensation Committees. 242 Subtitle E also requires covered
companies to be ready to disclose information on all incentive-based
compensation packages to regulators for the purposes of determining
whether they pose significant risk of loss to the company or reflect
excessive compensation for the employee.
Through subtitle E, the Investor Protection Act attempts to address
by legislation and regulation many of the concerns surrounding the
important issue of executive compensation. However, the provisions are
too vague because they propose only dates for compliance by the SEC to
fulfill its obligations, rather than hard rules, and also fail to address
enforcement and penalties associated with violations of the provision.
While they have not all been implemented, together the Volcker Rule,
Clawback Act, and Investor Protection Act reflect Congressional intent
to reduce risky behaviors on the part of executives by increasing their
exposure to liability.
E.

REGULATORS:CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

Ex post prudential regulation has proven an inadequate measure in
effectuating behavioral change at the upper levels of management. 243 In
236

Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 951-957 (Westlaw 2014).
§ 953.
238
§ 951.
239
§ 954.
240
§ 956.
241
§ 955.
242
§ 952.
243
See generally Elisa Kao, Moral Hazard During the Saving and Loan Crisis and the
Financial Crisis of 2008-2009: Implications for Reform and the Regulation of Systemic Risk
Through Disincentive Structures to Manage Firm Size and Interconnectedness, 67 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 817 (2012) (providing a general overview of systemic risk and traditional regulatory
practices).
237
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fact, as the previous discussion of Rule 10b5-1 shows, regulations can be
reinterpreted to provide unintended benefits to those meant to be
regulated. The government would best serve the interests of common
investors by establishing a broad policy of deterrence aimed at the Clevel suites of financial institutions. The recently established and
independently operated CFPB 244 already drafts legislation and works
directly with consumers, 245 so it is uniquely positioned to efficiently and
substantially implement this policy of deterrence.
The CFPB is “the most powerful agency in the history of American
politics . . . a stand-alone agency, allow[ed] to write any regulation it
wants, to sue anybody it wants, under broadly delegated powers without
any oversight from anybody.” 246 The Bureau’s jurisdiction largely
preempts state agency jurisdiction, which means that covered persons in
all 50 states are subject to the Bureau’s jurisdiction, 247 and most
consumer financial products and services that relate to the capacity of
corporate officers are currently included under the Bureau’s
jurisdiction. 248 Its authority to collect information extends to requiring
filing of special reports “or answers to specific questions, and to make
public such information as is in the public interest.” 249
The CFPB’s modern internet platform gives consumers direct lines
of communications with the agency. These are channels that open to the
consuming public when complaints are logged, and if enough people join
together, the CFPB has the discretionary power to file an inquiry on their
behalf. Never before has the consumer had such unfettered access to the
investigative and prosecutorial power of the federal government against
malfeasants whose behavior has reaped so much damage. Never has the
consumer been so empowered to lead the discussion on what might be
the best avenues for regulation of malfeasance within the sector.
One thing is clear: the traditional role of government as regulator
must evolve to more fully impact toxic influences in the financial system.
The long-term effects of the Subprime Crisis are the subject of ongoing
debate. While every crisis is identifiable by its distinct causes and
effects, each of America’s financial crises has been enabled by

244

H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (Westlaw 2014).
Will Consumers and the Economy Benefit from the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, Discussion from The Federalist Society’s 2011 National Lawyers Convention, 15 J.
CONSUMER & COM. L. 86, 87 (2012) (statement of Leonard Kennedy, General Counsel, CFPB).
246
Id. at 3 (statement of Todd Zywicki, Professor of Law, George Mason University School
of Law).
247
Id.
248
Id. at 106.
249
Id. at 208.
245
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combinations of factors that include investor overconfidence, investor
ignorance, systemic risk, and a regulatory environment purposely relaxed
by government legislation. 250 The CFPB is charged with monitoring
consumer confidence and given the responsibility of looking ahead for
risky products and services. 251 Through its close connection to the
consuming public, 252 its budgetary independence, 253 and its mandate to
create new powers for itself, 254 the CFPB is uniquely positioned to
implement the recommendations discussed below.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Part Three advocates securities industry self-regulation through a
policy of deterrence, to be facilitated through novel interpretations of the
doctrine of corporate civil liability and the legal concepts of scienter and
control person liability. A policy of deterrence would address the root
cause of financial crises: the ease with which executives, insulated from
both the consuming public and legal consequences, can operate with
impunity within the confines of highly complex corporate structures.
Just as “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” 255 so too is a
new policy of deterrence the most productive means by which the
government of the people can protect itself against the next conflagration
of corporate financial malfeasance.
Specifically, this part advances in three subparts. First, it advocates
that Congress reform the PSLRA to state a lower standard for pleading
scienter in civil cases of securities fraud. Second, it argues that the
CFPB is the regulatory agency best suited to represent the interests of
consumers in the financial services industry, and it advocates for the
CFPB to establish consumer-friendly access to courts, such that private
litigants will feel more empowered to use the court system to find
remedies. Within the context of the CFPB, this Comment argues that
consumers should specifically focus on corporate officers by pursuing
control person liability.
Class-action lawsuits against individual
executive defendants would enable common investors, for whom
individual litigation would involve prohibitive costs, to join as classes to
250

See Kao, supra note 243, at 821-828.
H.R. 3126.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
“An ounce of protection is worth a pound of cure” is attributed to Benjamin Franklin in his
capacity as founder of the Philadelphia Union Fire Company in 1736. PHILADELPHIA FIRE
DEPARTMENT, EMS HISTORY (2013).
251
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gain remuneration from executives whose compensation was directly
related to broad economic losses. Third, this section encourages
Congress to draft another Clawback Bill and then quickly to enact it.
A.

AMEND THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT: STATE
A LOWER STANDARD FOR PLEADING SCIENTER

Legislators should amend the PSLRA in order to ease pleading
standards for private investors so as to better facilitate their ability to
pursue remedies. Specifically, Congress should amend the clause—
”state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind” 256 —by eliminating the
words with particularity and strong.
The functional result of this change would be to shift the burden of
proof from plaintiff to defendant. This would force defendants to
disclose facts, thereby relieving courts of having to interpret the relevant
strength of various facts provided by plaintiffs who do not have the
benefit of a thorough fact finding investigation at the pleading stage.
Although the goal of the PSLRA in 1995 was to reduce frivolous
lawsuits, the current too large for trial climate justifies a reevaluation of
how class-action suits can best serve the consumers who have suffered
the largest share of economic loss.
The PSLRA worked well in achieving one of its twin goals,
protecting business, but made it nearly impossible for classes of honest
consumers to even initiate private litigation. 257 The judiciary has been
moving slowly in favor of plaintiffs; the legislative branch should take
notice of the direction of the courts and adjust pleading standards
accordingly.
B.

EMPOWER COMMON INVESTORS TO PURSUE LITIGATION: DEFINING
THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should seize on its
mandate to assert “independent authority under the Dodd-Frank Act . . .
[over] banking organizations with assets of $10 billion, with respect to
which the Bureau [has] exclusive rulemaking[,] examination, and
primary enforcement [] authority under Federal consumer financial

256
257

Pub.L. 104-67.
See discussion supra Part II.B.I.
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law.” 258 Specifically, the Bureau should take the initiative to identify the
financial institutions that caused the most damage to the system and
focus its powers on filing class-action suits on behalf of consumers
against those institutions’ corporate officers.
1.

Narrow Focus on the C-Level Suites

If consumers seek to assign liability where it truly belongs, and if
they have a real capacity to dictate the terms of investigations and
prosecutions, then they should begin to focus on the executives whose
decisions were the most devastating, and whose compensation are the
most ill-gotten. Golden parachutes allowed failed executives to escape
failed companies without accountability. Consumers would be wellserved to utilize the broad powers of the CFPB to ensure control person
accountability. 259
Hertz established that command and control dictate jurisdiction.
U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara advocated a corporate culture approach to
assigning blameworthiness, declaring that corporate ethos can be
identified as a surrogate in the absence of an identifiable actor within the
artificial entity that is a corporation. Because corporate ethos is shaped
within command and control centers, this is where litigants should focus
their energies.
2.

Advocate Class-Action Suits Against Individual Executives

Through the CFPB, common investors should form classes to
pursue remuneration from individual executives whose unjustifiable risktaking damaged the economy so deeply. Private lawsuits by consumers
often amass into class-action lawsuits against corporations, but under
such circumstances, the settlements that are reached are either too small
to affect the corporate identity or so large that they destroy the company.
With every destroyed company, there is a cost in terms of shareholder
value destruction and job losses.
It would therefore be both rational and feasible for the CFPB to
pursue class-action suits against individual executives. Where a single
litigant might fail against an executive defendant based purely on costanalyses basis to both parties, a class of litigants would likely not be
258

Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Enacted
into Law on July 21, 2010, 2010 WL 3417176 105 (Westlaw 2014).
259
See generally How we use complaint data, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,
www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/data-use/ (last visited Jun. 14, 2014) (providing a general
overview of how the CFPB responds to consumer complaints).
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dissuaded from a claim simply because an executive might have funds to
draw out proceedings. Hence, class-action suits against executives
would provide remedies without the destruction of companies and
corporations as a matter of course. Intensified focus on control person
liability best serves the interests of both consumers and corporations.
C.

ADOPT THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CLAWBACK FULL
ENFORCEMENT ACT IN THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF CLASS-ACTION
LAWSUIT LIABILITY

It is time for Representative Frank’s Clawback Act to be
resuscitated and adopted. There is no reason that executives who are
found liable in civil cases should be able to mitigate their personal losses
and further spread the cost to the public by using insurance. If top
executives realize that private individuals can more easily plead their
way into court, can work with the CFPB to build cases, and can come
together in classes ready to sue for compensation earned and punitive
damages, a fully armed Clawback Act would give them pause to look
before they leap.
Finally, in order to allow consumers to fully realize the benefits of
the above proposals, the judiciary must reinterpret the relationships
between corporations, their shareholders, and their clients. Courts should
embrace the realist model of corporate structure, which acknowledges
that corporate officers control the fate of corporations without
accountability to shareholder interests. The judiciary should model its
interpretation of modern corporate civil liability on historical analysis of
corporate criminal liability, thereby establishing a workable modern
doctrine based on the command and control interests espoused in Hertz,
placing liability where it rightfully belongs.
CONCLUSION
This Comment recognizes that corporations are essential to the
vitality of the U.S. economy. In light of their prominent role, it is now
more important than ever that the image of corporations be resuscitated.
But a corporate image can only reflect the value of its officers, and when
officers can take risks without attendant liability, they can hardly be
blamed for doing so. The law must acknowledge the unsustainable
paradox of current corporate civil liability doctrine, and in accordance
with the above recommendations, re-focus liability more intensely upon
C-level executives.
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